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Vindicating Civil Rights Under
42 U.S.C. § 14141: Guidance From
Procedures in Complex Litigation
by EUGENE KIM*
I. Introduction
It is no longer possible to be dismissive of police misconduct and
brutality, particularly when caused by systemic patterns or practices.
Some facts are beyond dispute. Former New York police officer
Justin Volpe pleaded guilty to beating and sodomizing Haitian immi-
grant Abner Louima with the handle of a toilet plunger and was sen-
tenced to thirty years in prison.1 Amadou Diallo had no prior crimi-
nal record and was completely unarmed and in his home when he was
killed by nineteen bullets after being shot at forty-one times by police
officers; these officers have been acquitted of all charges.2 In Los
Angeles, tape-recorded interviews of Detective Mark Fuhrman dur-
ing the O.J. Simpson proceedings revealed that Fuhrman had made
derogatory comments about minorities and women, routinely singled
out African Americans for arrest, planted evidence to convict people,
lied in court to win convictions and used excessive force against sus-
* Criminal Division, Office of Staff Attorneys, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit. J.D., U.C. Hastings College of the Law, 2002; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1996. I
would like to thank Professors Evan Lee and David Levine for their advice, instruction
and humanity. I would also like to thank my parents, Ik-Sam Kim and Sookhee Choe, and
my sister, Heidi Miran Kim, for their love and support.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN NEW YORK
CITY ch. 1 (Aug. 2000), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/nypolice/chl.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2003). The United States Commission on Civil Rights issued a report following a hearing
conducted in New York City to examine current police practices. The Commission is an
independent, bipartisan, fact-finding agency of the Executive Branch, established under
the Civil Rights Act of 1957. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS HOME PAGE,
http://www.usccr.gov/about/main.htm (last visited Feb 25, 2003).
2 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN NEW YORK
CITY ch. 1 (Aug. 2000), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/nypolice/chl.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2003).
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pects.3 In Riverside County, a videotape showed two sheriff's depu-
ties beating a man and a woman suspected of being undocumented
immigrants. After their failure to understand the deputies' com-
mands, one of the officers remarked, "bunch of wetbacks, huh?, 4 In
another instance of abject racism and depravity, a unit within the
Reynoldsburg, Ohio police department called itself the "S.N.A.T."
squad, for "Special Nigger Arrest Team."5 Instances such as these are
not uncommon and often result from a systemic pattern or practice of
acts or omissions.
In order to address institutional violation of civil rights, Congress
enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which authorizes the Attorney General to
seek injunctive relief from unconstitutional patterns or practices by
law enforcement officials.6 Part II of this note briefly surveys barriers
to traditional remedies for civil rights violations and identifies the ba-
sic legislative motivation behind 42 U.S.C. § 14141. Part III discusses
some complexities in initial cases brought under § 14141. Part IV ex-
amines key aspects of the resolution of § 14141 cases: approval and
release of jurisdiction over a consent decree and the employment of a
monitor to oversee compliance with the decree. This note proposes
that courts faced with resolution of § 14141 cases look for guidance to
procedures successfully used in complex litigation, with particular fo-
cus on provision of notice and opportunity to be heard, appointment
and employment of a special master, as well as approval of, and re-
lease of jurisdiction over, consent decrees.
3 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Racial and Ethnic Tensions in American Communities:
Poverty, Inequality, and Discrimination, Volume V: The Los Angeles Report (Feb. 2001),
http:// www.usccr.gov/pubs/larpt/chapterl.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
41id.
'H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 406, 1991 WL 206794, at *136 (1991).
6 Section 14141 provides:
(a) Unlawful conduct
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person
acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct
by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with
responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles
that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States.
(b) Civil action by Attorney General
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of para-
graph (1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States,
may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the
pattern or practice.
42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994).
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II. Legislative Motivation Behind 42 U.S.C. § 14141: to Provide
Formerly Unavailable Relief in Light of Barriers to Remedying
Civil Rights Violations by Law Enforcement Officials
It is crucial to recognize that 42 U.S.C. § 14141 was intended to
"close [the] gap in the law" created by the modern equitable standing
doctrine, which forecloses an individual from obtaining injunctive re-
lief against police misconduct absent a likelihood of future harm to
that particular plaintiff. Congress intended to confer standing upon
the United States Attorney General to obtain civil injunctive relief
against governmental authorities for unconstitutional patterns or
practices.8
The House Committee on the Judiciary recognized that federal
criminal civil rights laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, have not afforded
the Department of Justice (DOJ) authority to seek civil injunctive re-
lief from systemic patterns or practices of police misconduct.9 In
United States v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit denied the At-
torney General standing to pursue civil injunctive relief and dismissed
the case, unwilling to read an implied right of civil action into criminal
statutes or grant the Executive the power to sue local governments
without congressional authorization.'" The House Committee on the
Judiciary stated that this represented "a serious and outdated gap in
the federal scheme for protecting constitutional rights."" Commenta-
tors have observed that, in addition to the inability to seek injunctive
relief, the success of criminal actions under §§ 241 and 242 is hindered
by the specific-intent requirement.'2 These statutes not only require
that a police officer's actions had the effect of a deprivation of consti-
'United States v. City of Columbus, No. 2-99 CV 1097, 2000 WL 1133166, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 3, 2000) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 406, 1991 WL
206794, at *138 (1991)). The magistrate judge in City of Columbus observed that, al-
though § 14141 itself has no direct legislative history, the history of the Omnibus Crime
Bill Act, never actually promulgated, is instructive because it contained a provision nearly
identical to § 14141. 2000 WL 1133166, at *3.
8id.
H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 406, 1991 WL 206794, at *137 (1991)
(citing United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980)).
10 United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1980). The DOJ had
engaged in an extensive investigation of the Philadelphia Police Department that revealed
widespread misconduct and institutional problems.
"H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 406,1991 WL 206794, at *137 (1991).
2 See Marshall Miller, Note, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 153 (1998).
Marshall Miller provides a thorough discussion of the legislative background of § 14141 as
well as these traditional barriers to a civil rights remedy, noted here for context and re-
view.
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tutional rights, but also that the officer intended the deprivation. 3 In
addition, the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) policy decision to defer
to local authorities decreased the number of criminal investigations of
complaints against officers. 4
Criminal prosecutions by local authorities theoretically afford
remedy for assault, battery, manslaughter or murder, but prosecu-
tions are extremely rare for a number of reasons. Evidentiary factors
contribute to the difficulty. 5 Since victims of police misconduct are
often felons, criminal suspects, or other marginalized members of so-
ciety, they lack credibility before a jury.' 6 In many cases, the only
other witnesses are fellow police officers, who often invoke a "code of
silence."" Structural barriers also contribute to the difficulty of local
authorities' ability to remedy civil rights violations. Prosecutors are
hesitant to bring charges against police officers, upon whom they de-
pend.'8 A recent example of this phenomenon is one officer, Andrew
Teague, who was accused of perjury in court and fabricating evidence
that led to the dismissal of a murder charge. 9 Though the Los Ange-
" See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1966) (applying specific-intent re-
quirement in § 241 suit); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945) (applying spe-
cific-intent requirement in § 242 suit).
14 H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 1991 WL 206794, at *136 (1991); see also
Miller, supra note 12, at 153-54. Marshall Miller has noted that the DOJ received more
than 8,000 complaints and investigated more than 3,000 complaints of police misconduct
per year in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but federal prosecutors annually pursued in-
dictments in only fifty to sixty cases. Between 1981 and 1991 in Los Angeles, the DOJ ini-
tialed only three prosecutions against police officers during the ten-year period, although,
as later demonstrated by the Los Angeles Ramparts scandal, unconstitutional patterns or
practices existed.
15 Miller, supra note 12, at 152.
16 Id. at 152 (citing DOUGLAS W. PEREZ, COMMON SENSE ABOUT POLICE REVIEW 24
(1994)). Juries often may be wary of sending police officers to prison for lengthy periods
of time for mistreating a known criminal.
'7 See, e.g., Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 467 n.6 (1985); Kinney v. Weaver, 301 F.3d 253,
277 (5th Cir. 2002) (observing police chiefs' and sheriffs' employment of "code of silence"
prohibiting persons who work in law enforcement from speaking out about other officers'
misconduct); Miller, supra note 12, at 152 (citing PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE:
POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 51 (1995)).
"4 See id. Local authorities have often refused to recognize the existence of a problem.
Even after Abner Louima was taken to the bathroom, beaten severely and tortured with
the handle of a plunger, and notwithstanding a recent study by Amnesty International re-
porting an alarming pattern of excessive force by NYPD officers, local authorities initially
refused to recognize that the incident represented anything more than an isolated occur-
rence. Id. at 149.
"9 See Mark Curriden, When Good Cops Go Bad: The Justice Department Has a New
Weapon to Fight Police Brutality. The Question Is, How Will the Government Use It?, 82
A.B.A. J. 62, 64 (May 1996).
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les district attorney's office agreed that Teague did commit the al-
leged offenses, the office decided not to prosecute.
Congress also recognized that, due to the U.S. Supreme Court's
equitable standing doctrine, private individuals lack standing to seek
civil injunctive relief in most instances and that damages are an insuf-
ficient remedy.21 A private plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive
relief against unconstitutional patterns or practices only if she can
show to a substantial certainty that she will suffer similar injury in the
future. In Rizzo v. Goode, for example, although the district court
had found the number of constitutional violations by police officers
"unacceptably high" and too frequent to be dismissed as rare, isolated
occurrences, the Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the
plaintiffs lacked the requisite personal stake in the outcome to pursue
injunctive relief because past exposure to illegal conduct did not
demonstrate a likelihood of future harm.23 In City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, the Court overturned a preliminary injunction enjoining a
chokehold that carried high risk of death or serious injury, holding
that neither the plaintiff's exposure to the chokehold nor the police
department's continued use of the chokehold constituted sufficient
threat of future harm to confer standing upon the plaintiff.24  The
Court denied standing based on constitutional rather than prudential
limitations, thereby safeguarding its doctrine from being overturned
by Congress.25 Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent that the deci-
sion left the city "free to continue the policy indefinitely," so long as it
was willing to pay damage awards for the rare successful suits for in-
juries and deaths that result. 26 Along the same lines, the 1991 House
Committee on the Judiciary stated:
Currently, changes in a police departments[sic] pol-
icy are prompted by successful criminal cases or
damage actions; the cumulative weight of convic-
tions or adverse monetary judgments may lead the
20 id.
2' H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 1991 WL 206794, at *137.
22 See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citi-
zens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1396 (2000) (citing
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)).
423 U.S. at 372-73.
24 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
25 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Congress may override the Court's
prudential standing limitations, but it may not legislate around Article III standing re-
quirements.
2' Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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police leadership to conclude that change is neces-
sary. This is an inefficient way to enforce the Con-
stitution and is not always effective. Some police
departments have shown they are willing to absorb
millions of damage payments per year without
changing their policies. 7
Damages awards are also a rare and insufficient remedy because
juries are reluctant to impose heavy damage awards against working
class officers.28 Even if a § 1983 plaintiff proves commission of the of-
fense, the defendant may still avoid liability if he establishes a good
faith belief in the reasonableness of his actions. Moreover, state and
local laws often indemnify officers, so offending officers have no eco-
nomic incentive to change their behavior because a civil suit has no
economic impact on them."'
The Rodney King incident and ensuing national outcry, particu-
larly by minorities, compelled congressional action." Subsequent to
the Rodney King incident, the Police Accountability Act was incor-
porated into the House Omnibus Crime Bill as Title XII. 3 2 Title XII
authorized the Attorney General to sue for injunctive relief,33 but the
Crime Bill never reached President Bush Senior due to a filibuster by
Senate Republicans and the threat of veto.34 The 103d Congress re-
considered the issue and drafted the Violent Crime Control and Law
27 H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 1991 WL 206794, at *138 (1991).
'8 Federal Response to Police Misconduct: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 17 (1992) (state-
ment of Judge John Newman); Miller, supra note 12, at 155.
29 Jon 0. Newman, Suing The Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen The Section 1983
Damage Remedy For Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 459 (1978); see 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
30 See Miller, supra note 12, at 156.
" H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 1991 WL 206794, at *135-36 (1991). In
considering the need for legislation that confers standing to pursue injunctive relief on the
Attorney General, the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights held two
days of hearings and the report of the House Committee on the Judiciary specifically re-
ferred to the Rodney King incident and to alleged misconduct in Boston, New York City
and Reynoldsburg, Ohio. In the hearings before the subcommittee, Professor James Fyfe,
a sixteen-year veteran of the NYPD, stated that the King incident was no aberration and
that "there exists in LAPD a culture in which officers who choose to be brutal and abusive
are left to do so without fear of interference." Id. at *135. The committee report re-
viewed, among other things, the findings of the Independent Commission on the Los An-
geles Police Department, headed by former Deputy Attorney General and Deputy Secre-
tary of State Warren Christopher.
32 H.R. 3371, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-1085, at 149-50 (1992).
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-405, at 223-24 (1991).
34 Miller, supra note 12, at 164.
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Enforcement Act of 1993, which included a provision giving the At-
torney General authorization to pursue injunctive relief for patterns
of police misconduct.35 The final enacted version included this provi-
sion, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141.36
Il. Section 14141 Enforcement
A. Initial Cases
The methodology of the DOJ has been to investigate and try to
negotiate consent decrees,37 rather than to pursue litigation. The
DOJ's "strategy has been one of negotiation with resort to litigation
only when efforts at conciliatory resolution fail., 3' As of August 2001,
the DOJ was investigating police departments in at least fourteen
cities.39 Based on these investigations, the DOJ has initiated lawsuits
against at least five state and local governments.0
The first case was United States v. City of Pittsburgh, brought
against the Pittsburgh police force in 1996, in response to the killing
of an African American businessman by police officers and a subse-
quent class action brought by community leaders and the American
31 S.1488, 103d Cong. (1993); Miller, supra note 12, at 164.
6Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXI 108 Stat. 2071 (1994).
17 A consent decree is a negotiated settlement of a case brought in equity, enforceable by
contempt. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 518
(1986). It is a hybrid between a contract negotiated at arm's length and a judicial order.
United States v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n.10 (1975). Consent decrees
have historically been entered in antitrust cases, and are common to other suits affecting
public policy, including environmental cases, institutional reform litigation and school and
housing desegregation suits. Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title
VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J.
887, 888 (1984). For instance, as of 1995, an estimated 70% of government antitrust cases
were settled by consent decree. Lloyd C. Anderson, United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust
Consent Decrees, and the Need for a Proper Scope of Judicial Review, 65 ANTITRUST L.J.
1, 4 (1996) (citing Stephen Squeri, Government Investigation and Enforcement: Antitrust
Division, in 36TH ANN. ANTITRUST L. INST. 519, 564 (1995)). Consent decrees are com-
mon in Title VII class actions as well, because settlements save the parties the time, cost
and emotional difficulty of large-scale litigation, and because they complement public law
cases. Schwarzschild, supra, note at 898-99.
Nat'l Congress for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154, 166
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)
" Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C.
2001). The district court observed that cities under investigation include: Buffalo, New
York; Charleston, West Virginia; Eastpointe, Michigan; Los Angeles, California; New
Orleans, Louisiana; New York, New York; Orange County, Florida; Prince George's
County, Maryland; Riverside, California; and Washington, D.C.
4°id.
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Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).4 ' A consent decree was entered into
by the city.4 2 The detailed forty-page decree requires the city, among
other things, to institute a computerized "early-warning system" to
flag problem officers; mandates that officers write detailed reports
each time they use force, perform searches or stops; requires that all
complaints filed against officers are investigated and filed; and estab-
lishes procedures for reviewing officers' performance, complaints
against them, arrests, and other job functions.43
The consent decree that resulted from the second suit, United
States v. City of Steubenville, and subsequent consent decrees were
modeled after City of Pittsburgh." In New Jersey and in Highland
Park, Illinois, parties also negotiated settlements through imposition
of a court-authorized consent decree. 5 The DOJ's focus has been on
implementation of particular policies rather than attainment of statis-
tical goals.46 To this end, the DOJ has negotiated consent decrees and
memoranda of agreement with the other cities under investigation.
In United States v. City of Columbus,48 the magistrate rejected the
defendant city's challenge to § 14141's constitutionality. The magis-
trate concluded that under the test set forth by the U.S. Supreme
Court in City of Boerne, § 14141 was a valid exercise of congressional
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.49 The United States al-
41 Gilles, supra note 22, at 1405-06.
42 See id. (citing Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Agreement
with Pittsburgh Police Department, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1997/February97/083cr.htm (Feb. 26,1997)).
43 See Gilles, supra note 22, at 1406 (citing United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997)).
44 Id. (citing United States v. City of Steubenville, No. C2-97-966 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3,
1997)).
4' Grand Lodge, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 9; see U.S. Dep't of Justice, Settlements and Court De-
cisions: Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/findsettle.htm#Settlements (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
46 Miller, supra note 12, at 190. Marshall Miller has observed that in order to terminate the
decrees, the defendant municipalities must demonstrate that they have established the re-
quired procedures, not that they have reduced the number or frequency of rights viola-
tions. This may be just as well, because available statistics are poor indicators of the level
of police misconduct, and the institutional nature of the changes indicates that the changes
will remain in place even after the decrees have expired.
41 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Settlements and Court Decisions: Conduct of Law Enforce-
ment Agencies, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/findsettle.htm#Settlements (last visited
Feb. 27, 2003).
" No. CIV.A.2:99 CV 1097,2000 WL 1133166, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3,2000).
49 Id. at *8-9 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2000) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997)). The magistrate concluded that, in view of the drafters' intent to close the gap in
the law left by the Court's hostility to injunctive relief in § 1983 actions, § 14141 is suffi-
[Vol. 29:4
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leged that officers of the Columbus Division of Police have subjected
individuals to excessive force, false arrests and charges, and improper
searches and seizures and that the defendant city has tolerated the
conduct by failing to implement adequate policies, training, supervi-
sion, monitoring and incident investigation procedures." Fourteen
United States Representatives and the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal
Order of the Police filed motions for leave to participate as amici cu-
riae, granted by the district court in November 2000."
In Los Angeles, the facts seem to speak for themselves. In 1991,
the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department,
formed in the wake of the Rodney King beating, identified forty-four
"problem officers" in the police department, all with six or more
complaints of excessive force or improper tactics filed against them
between 1986 and 1990.52 As of late 1995, of those forty-four officers,
three had been fired, ten had quit, nine had been promoted, ten were
still on patrol duty and two had actually killed suspects while on
duty.3 The Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police De-
partment, cited by the 1991 House Judiciary Committee, concluded
that "there is a significant number of officers in the LAPD who re-
petitively use excessive force against the public."54 Moreover, the
conduct of these officers was well known to LAPD management, who
condoned the behavior through a pattern of lax supervision and in-
adequate investigation of complaints.5 United States v. City of Los
Angeles56 was initiated in November 2000. The DOJ filed a § 14141
action against the City of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police De-
partment and the City's Board of Police Commissioners, alleging the
police department had engaged in a pattern or practice of using ex-
cessive force, falsely arresting persons, and improperly stopping,
searching and seizing people in Los Angeles. 7 The parties have since
negotiated a consent decree.58
ciently congruent and proportional to the constitutional harm identified in the legislative
history.
50 Id. at *1.
United States v. City of Columbus, 2000 WL 1745293, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2000).
52 Curriden, supra note 19, at 64.
13 See id.
H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 1991 WL 206794, at *135 (1991).
55 id.
56 No. CV 00-11769(GAF)(JWJx), 2001 WL 314976, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1747 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 16, 2001).
"7 Id. at *1
'8 Consent Decree, United States v. Los Angeles, No. CV 00-11769(GAF) (C.D. Cal. June
Summer 2002]
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B. Some Obstacles that § 14141 Overcomes
Section 14141 empowers the Attorney General to pursue injunc-
tive relief when he "has reasonable cause to believe that a viola-
tion.., has occurred." 9 In addressing similar statutory language,
lower courts have held the Attorney General's determination of rea-
sonable cause to be beyond judicial review.60 The Supreme Court has
recognized that "an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce,
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally
committed to an agency's absolute discretion., 6' In view of the liberal
pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), allega-
tions of misconduct need only be accompanied by facts that could
support a pattern or practice claim.62 As a result, the Attorney Gen-
eral will have ready access to discovery through the filing of a com-
plaint detailing repeated incidents of police abuse. 3 Indeed, the
magistrate in City of Columbus concluded that liberal rather than
heightened pleading standards apply and that "the complaint is not
inadequate for failure to include factual or evidentiary detail best left
to the discovery process. '
When a specific unconstitutional police policy can be identified,
federal courts need only enjoin the implementation of the policy. For
example, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the district court had issued
a preliminary injunction prohibiting the use by a police officer of a
potentially lethal chokehold except when threatened with death or
serious bodily injury.65 Similarly, when the incidents of misconduct
are the result of inadequate training, courts may fashion equitable re-
lief accordingly.66
Negotiation of consent decrees moves the burden of designing
remedial relief to litigating parties, and parties may reach accord
without judicial intervention.6 As a practical matter, consent decrees
15, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm (last visited May 2,
2003).
" 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b).
6' See Miller, supra note 12, at 180.
61 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
13 See Miller, supra note 12, at 181.
64 No. CIV.A.2:99 CV 1097, 2000 WL 1133166, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2000).
65 461 U.S. 95, 99-100 (1983).
66 Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that deprivation
of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights was direct consequence of Mason County's failure
to adequately train its deputies).
67 Miller, supra note 12, at 183.
[Vol. 29:4
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would conserve the DOJ's resources.' The less the DOJ is tied up in
litigation, the more it can further investigate nationally and oversee
implementation of decree provisions. Moreover, negotiation as op-
posed to litigation may provide for more peaceful relations with the
defendant municipality. Municipal and police officials have an oppor-
tunity not only to provide support for the implemented provisions,
but also to foster community confidence rather than antagonism. For
example, in City of Pittsburgh, both Mayor Murphy and Police Chief
Robert W. McNeilly expressed support for the consent decree.69
If positive attitudes, humility and statistics are any indication of
success, the District of Columbia has demonstrated that it is possible
to address potentially unconstitutional patterns and practices without
compromising quality law enforcement.7" In an unprecedented and
noble act of outreach, D.C. Mayor Williams and Police Chief Ramsey
on their own initiative contacted the DOJ to request the Civil Rights
Division's comprehensive investigation of excessive force.7' Together,
they implemented reforms without the aid of the court and without
protracted and expensive litigation, thereby instituting reforms simi-
lar to other cities without the transaction costs.2 Attorney General
Ashcroft observed that "[t]hese reforms have been implemented
without impairing the ability of the police department to fight crime.
In fact, last year we saw a decline in the number of murders and in the
crime indexed in the District of Columbia."73 Mayor Williams noted
that "[c]rime in [D.C.] is at its lowest point in three decades, proving
that community policing and resident partnerships can and do make a
difference. 74 Officer-involved shootings fell 78% from 1998 to 2000,
and citizen complaints of excessive force fell 36% from 1999 to 2000. 75
Chief Ramsey added that "the memorandum of agreement... re-
quires monitors, both internal and external, who will track our prog-
ress. This process is an open book. We will be held accountable not
Id. at 187.
69 See Marylynne Pitz & John M. R. Bull, Court Oks City Police Reform Agreement: Settles
U.S. Suit Charging Patterns of Abuse, PITISBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 17, 1997, at C1.
" See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General News Conference with D.C. Mayor An-
thony Williams and D.C. Police Chief Charles Ramsey (June 13, 2001), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/mpdpressconf.htm (last visited May 2, 2003).
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 Id. Ashcroft stated, however, that if, for some reason, compliance is not forthcoming,
the memorandum of understanding provides that the DOJ will be able to seek enforce-
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only to the Justice Department, but also to the community for how we
perform."76
C. Some Complexities in § 14141 Cases
1. Construction of "pattern or practice" and relation to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
There is little or no explicit legislative guidance in interpretation
of "patterns or practices," but principles may be derived from other
contexts and from case studies in the 1991 Judiciary Committee Re-
port. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in Title VII, the "pattern
or practice" language is not a term of art and words reflect their usual
meaning.77 Courts have emphasized that each "pattern or practice"
case must stand on its own facts." In general, courts have interpreted
the term "pattern or practice" broadly.7 9 A plaintiff in a "pattern or
practice" case may rely solely on disparate impact, whereas under the
Fourteenth Amendment and many civil rights statutes, a plaintiff
must prove disparate treatment in order to prove discrimination.
The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs can make out a prima fa-
cie case of "pattern or practice" discrimination simply through the in-
troduction of statistical evidence."s Since statistical evidence is suffi-
cient proof of a "pattern or practice" of discrimination, plaintiffs need
not prove any overt institutional policy to satisfy the Teamsters defini-
tion.
Though it may provide guidance in interpretation, § 1983 case
law should not be binding on the courts, as supported by the congres-
sional decision to use the term "pattern or practice," rather than "cus-
tom" from § 1983 case law.' In addition, the absence of limiting ad-
jectives such as "continuing," "widespread," and "persistent" suggests
that proving a "pattern or practice" of police misconduct should be
easier under § 14141.3 One district court has addressed the interac-
tion between § 1983 and § 14141 to some extent.8' In a class action
76 See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General News Conference with D.C. Mayor An-
thony Williams and D.C. Police Chief Charles Ramsey (June 13, 2001), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/mpdpressconf.htm (last visited May 2, 2003).
77 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977).
78 See Miller, supra note 12, at 171.
79 Id.
80 Id.
" See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1977).
82 See Miller, supra note 12, at 166.
13 See id.
See Nat'l Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154
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brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by African American and La-
tino individuals in New York, the district court held that there was no
danger of inconsistent rulings simply because the DOJ commenced
investigations simultaneously. 5 The district court stated that the
statutory authority under which the federal investigations were pro-
ceeding was distinct from the class action brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.' The court further stated that if the DOJ were to initiate an
action, principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel would ensure
against inconsistent rulings.' According to the district court's treat-
ment of federal investigations versus individual actions, no danger of
inconsistent adjudication arises from the mere fact of simultaneous
proceedings alone.
The 1991 Judiciary Committee Report, which dealt with
§ 14141's virtually identical predecessor, suggests that a "pattern or
practice" need not be based on extensive evidence of systematic re-
peated violations." The committee stated that "authority is
needed... to address patterns or practices such as the lack of train-
ing, or the routine use of deadly chokeholds, or the absence of a
monitoring and disciplinary system."89 The report cited actual cases
involving acts or omissions that could constitute patterns or practices
in illustrating the potential applicability of § 14141 to situations where
relief formerly was unavailable. For instance, Davis v. Mason
County' involved a § 1983 claim arising from four incidents of exces-
sive force by police officers during routine traffic stops within a nine
month period in Mason County, Washington. The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's finding that individual sheriffs had violated the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights and held Mason County liable for fail-
ure to adequately train its officers.9' The Judiciary Committee stated
that § 14141 would authorize the court to force Mason County to cor-
rect deficient training procedures?
Likewise, in discussing Swann v. Goldsboro, where police offi-
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
" Id. at 166 (rejecting defendants' argument that primary jurisdiction should apply to stay
plaintiffs' equitable claims pending resolution of pattern or practice investigations com-
menced by the DOJ).
86 id.
87id.
88H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 406,1991 WL 206794, at *138-39 (1991).
89 Id.
90 927 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1991).
91 Davis, 927 F.2d at 1479-82.
H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 406, 1991 WL 206794, at *138-39 (1991).
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cers strangled a young black man to death, the Judiciary Committee
stated that under § 14141 the court could have acted to "order reme-
dies for the glaring deficiencies the case highlighted."93 Evidence at
trial indicated that the police officers had engaged in previous inci-
dents involving excessive force without incurring disciplinary action
and that the City of Goldsboro had an official policy against investi-
gating incidents of excessive force.94 District courts therefore are
given minimal interpretive guidance and a good deal of discretion in
fact finding.
2. Commitment and resources of the Attorney General
The Attorney General's commitment will also affect the useful-
ness of § 14141. The DOJ has proceeded with caution, perhaps to en-
sure that "the first cases are sure, solid cases that help establish good
law."9' 5 On the other hand, Paul Chevigny has asserted that "the Jus-
tice Department doesn't like and doesn't want to take on these cases"
and that "[t]he only reason they prosecuted the Rodney King
cases... [was] to make people think the federal government was do-
ing something."96 The political ideology and commitment of the ex-
ecutive may affect the proactive enforcement of § 14141."' For exam-
ple, the failure of the Reagan administration to actively enforce the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), authorizing
the Attorney General to pursue injunctive relief to remedy patterns
or practices of constitutional deprivations against institutionalized
persons, indicates that a grant of statutory authority to the executive
branch does not necessarily elicit enforcement.98
Even if the DOJ seeks to proactively enforce § 14141, lack of re-
sources is always an overriding concern. Congress may not direct the
Attorney General not to enforce a statute.9  Congress may, however,
use its spending power to limit funding to the DOJ and to the Civil
Rights Division in particular."° Since 1993, Congress expanded the
duties of the Civil Rights Division but did not increase the budget in
Id. at *139 (citing 137 F.R.D. 230 (E.D.N.C. 1990)).
See id.
9' See Curriden, supra note 19, at 63 (quoting Deval Patrick, Deputy U.S. Attorney in
charge of the Civil Rights Division).
96 Id.
97 See Miller, supra note 12, at 176.
98 See id.
99 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983).
' o Miller, supra note 12, at 176 (citing Steven A. Holmes, Federal Anti-Bias Spending is
Inadequate, Groups Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998).
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proportion.' As of 1998, the Special Litigation Section - which as-
sumes primary responsibility for § 14141 enforcement and includes
essentially the only people empowered to seek injunctive relief for
civil rights violations - did not have any full-time investigators 2 and
as of 2000, only twenty-six full- or part-time attorneys were assigned
to the Special Litigation Section.0  Commentators have recently ob-
served that it is still a long shot to actually get relief, in part because
the "department is badly understaffed and is under a hiring freeze."'"
3. Judicial attitudes toward structural injunctions
The past century has witnessed the rise and decline of structural
injunctions in civil rights litigation. The height of judicial involve-
ment in community organization was after the U.S. Supreme Court
authorized federal district courts to retain jurisdiction over desegrega-
tion and fashion appropriate equitable remedies."" The use of struc-
tural injunctions received academic criticism in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. 1°7 Recent doctrine establishes that with regard to district
court injunctions, "the nature of the violation determines the scope of
the remedy"'" and that district courts should take into account the in-
terests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs."°
The Court also has been skeptical of structural injunctions, stating
that although it is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants who
have suffered or will imminently suffer actual harm, "it is not the role
of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions
of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the
Constitution.''110
101 Miller, supra note 12, at 200 n.196 (citing Oversight of the Civil Rights Division: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. (1997), 1997 WL 10571840, at *1 (statement of Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Acting Assis-
tant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division)). Congress expanded the Justice Depart-
ment's duties to include prosecution of church arson crimes, enforcement of the Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, as well as enforcement of § 14141.
"' See Miller supra note 12, at 185.
103 See Gilles, supra note 22, at 1409-10.
'o4See Curriden, supra note 19, at 64.
'o' See Miller, supra note 12, at 194-96.
o6See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
07 See Miller, supra note 12, at 195.
'o8See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
109 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977).
"' Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (stating that courts may properly remedy past
or imminent official interference with inmates' presentation of claims to the courts, but it
is for the political branches of state and federal governments to manage prisons in such a
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Negotiation of consent decrees, which requires the cooperation
of state and local authorities in crafting equitable relief, does not im-
plicate the same degree of federalism-based hostility toward judicial
intermeddling into local affairs. District courts should not hesitate to
actively oversee § 14141 reform upon sufficient indicia of constitu-
tional violations, since "[o]nce a right and a violation have been
shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad.".' Much depends upon the district courts' proactive
involvement in fashioning remedial measures. Although, as dis-
cussed, consent decrees in institutional reform litigation have their
benefits, they also reduce the involvement of the courts. Since the
decrees are often filed the same day as the complaint, trial judges
have no opportunity to supervise discovery or oversee proceedings,
and since decrees are often afforded deference, trial judges have little
practical basis for assessing the fairness or efficacy of the decree."' In
view of the barriers to injunctive relief from civil rights violations, the
legislative intent to compensate for the gap in the standing doctrine
left by Lyons and the fact that a few DOJ attorneys must attempt to
bargain for the rightful position of a community, courts are well ad-
vised to assume an active stance toward case management, regardless
whether the parties negotiate consent decrees.
IV. Guidance From Complex Litigation
This note proposes that district courts faced with § 14141 suits
look for guidance to procedures used in complex litigation. Specifi-
cally, benefits would arise from appointing a special master to moni-
tor or oversee compliance with the decree provisions and to assist the
court by engaging in other specialized duties throughout the process.
In crafting the decree, parties should bear in mind the type of decree
involved and set forth their intent with particularity, for purposes of
clarity upon review and modification, if necessary. Before approval
of a decree, notice and opportunity for comment would provide a
more complete picture to the court and may prevent protracted litiga-
tion, such as later challenges to inadequacy of representation. In ad-
dition, antitrust and mass tort litigation impart relevant factors for
consideration when determining whether to approve a proposed de-
cree that affects multiple parties and nonparties alike. Toward the
way as to preclude official interference with the presentation of claims).
.. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (holding that if school authorities fail in their obligations in de-
segregation cases, judicial authority may be invoked).
1 Miller, supra note 12, at 188.
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end of a decree's life cycle, particular considerations arise when it be-
comes time for the court to release jurisdiction and if it becomes nec-
essary to resume jurisdiction.
A. Employment of Special Masters
This part of the note will discuss the authority for appointment of
a special master, the different types of masters that federal courts
have employed, some of their uses in institutional reform to date and
possible uses in § 14141 cases. Special masters may enable a more ef-
ficient and informed disposition of § 14141 cases while reducing the
strain on judicial resources, particularly with respect to the manage-
rial, investigative and monitoring aspects of litigation. In addition,
special masters may help the parties reach accord and allow for the
involvement of nonparties with interests in the litigation.
Federal courts have appointed special masters in order to ad-
dress overlapping problems of limited judicial resources, shortcom-
ings of the traditional adjudicatory system, and shortcomings of par-
ties and counsel."3  Courts have employed the services of masters
particularly in the most resource-threatening complex litigation, in-
cluding mass torts (such as actions involving Agent Orange or DDT),
antitrust, school desegregation, prison and other institutional re-
form.' 4 Special masters have assisted judges in pretrial administra-
tion and case management, gathering facts, interrogating parties, con-
ferring with experts, making recommendations or rulings on
discovery issues, recommending findings of fact and conclusions of
law, promoting joint stipulation of facts, facilitating settlement, fram-
ing remedial orders and monitoring the implementation of judicial
decrees."5
1. Authority for the appointment of masters
The basic sources of authority for the appointment of special
masters include Rules 53 and 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the court's inherent authority and the parties' consent."6 The
impact of a special master differs according to what authority the
"' Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Re-
shaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 394-95 (1986). J
14 Id. at 398-99; Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters:
Administrative Agencies for the Courts, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235, 249 (1997).
115 Farrell, supra note 114, at 237-38, 240-42.
16 David I. Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in Fed-
eral Institutional Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
753, 755 (1984).
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court relies upon for appointment. The district court in Armstrong v.
O'Connell discussed one reason why the authority for appointment
matters."7 The critical difference, according to the Armstrong court,
is that findings of fact in the report of a traditional Rule 53 master
would be entitled to a presumption of validity under Rule 53(e)(2),
whereas the report and recommendations of a remedial master not
appointed under the rule would not be entitled to the same presump-
tion of validity."8
Rule 53 provides that the court in which any action is pending
may appoint a special master."9 The rule mandates that reference to
a master shall be the exception and not the rule.120 In La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., the Supreme Court held that calendar conges-
tion, possibility of a lengthy trial and complexity of issues in an anti-
trust action were not sufficient justifications for the Rule 53 appoint-
ment.1 21 Since complexity of issues defines most public law litigation,
a district court faced with a § 14141 case should therefore set forth ra-
tionales for appointment sufficient to set the case apart from the re-
mainder of the class of institutional reform cases, if it relies on Rule
53
.122
The applicability of Rule 70 comes with important limitations.
Most relevant to § 14141 is the limitation that Rule 70 is not applica-
ble without a judgment.1 23 The recent history of implementing reform
decrees teaches that parties often seek, and judges benefit from, the
appointment of masters early in the process of formulating a remedial
plan.1 24 If the court faced with a § 14141 case wishes to appoint a spe-
cial master earlier in the process, it must therefore look to Rule 53 or
to its inherent power for authority.
In addition to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have
relied on their inherent power in appointing special masters. 25 The
primary source of authority for this inherent power is the U.S. Su-
126preme Court's decision in Ex Parte Peterson. Writing for the Court,
17 416 F. Supp. 1325, 1336-39 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
118 Id.
'9 FED. R. CIv. P. 53(a).
120 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b).
121 352 U.S. 249, 256-59 (1957).
,' See Levine, supra note 116, at 800-01.
113 FED. R. Civ. P. 70; Levine, supra note 116, at 798-99.
124 Levine, supra note 116, at 799.
'2 Id. at 788; see, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1169-70 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
126 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
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Justice Brandeis affirmed that the courts' inherent power to provide
themselves with appropriate instruments required for the perform-
ance of their duties includes the authority to appoint persons uncon-
nected with the court.'27 Judge Irving Kaufman has since asserted that
"[o]ver and above the authority contained in rule 53... , there has
always existed in the federal courts an inherent authority to appoint
masters as a natural concomitant of their judicial power."'28 It is un-
clear from the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 53, however,
whether the Committee intended the new rule to replace the inherent
authority affirmed by Peterson or to leave room for inherent power
beyond the terms of Rule 53.129 In § 14141 cases, courts therefore
should consider appointing masters under both Rule 53 and the
court's own inherent power as independent sources of authority.
2. Appointment of a special master in § 14141 cases: special
considerations, limitations and the importance of community
confidence
If the federal court in a § 14141 case considers appointing a mas-
ter, it should pay particular attention to the mandate in Rule 53(b)
that reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule.'
3
1
Under La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., it is not sufficient to set forth
factors that will distinguish an entire class of cases from the rest of the
docket. 3' Appointment under Rule 53 would be appropriate, for in-
stance, when expertise in a nonlegal area is essential for complete re-
lief, when individuals must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis or
when parties are unable to develop a remedial plan.'32 These justifica-
tions do not violate La Buy because they are not common to all insti-
tutional litigation.'
If the court refers to a special master to make recommended
findings of fact necessary for liability, a greater showing of excep-
tional conditions may be required than would be required to sustain a
... Id. at 312-13.
128 Irving Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 462
(1958).
"' Levine, supra note 116, at 793. Another problem with reliance on the inherent power is
that courts lack guidelines to determine the propriety of an appointment. Id. at 789. It is
unclear whether the limitations of Rule 53 should apply in the context of appointment un-
der the court's inherent power. Id. at 790.
'30 See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
131 Levine, supra note 116, at 801 (citing 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957)).
132 Id. at 801-02.
133 Id.
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Rule 53 appointment for assisting discovery or remedial measures. '
This may be a concern, ultimately for efficiency and economy, since
appellate courts have invalidated references and withdrawn appoint-
ments for want of exceptional circumstances or on their merits for
violation of Article III of the Constitution.'35 Accordingly, although
Rule 53(c) provides for broad powers, in order to steer clear of con-
stitutional challenges the district court should try to ensure parties'
consent to the order of reference, limit determination of ultimate is-
sues, and provide for de novo review of the master's reports.36
Since § 14141 is predicated on a finding of an "unconstitutional
pattern or practice," courts should exercise caution when delineating
the scope of the masters' role with regard to enforcement and over-
sight of compliance efforts, in order to avoid challenges that the order
of reference improperly abdicates judicial responsibilities. A monitor
appointed solely by the parties' agreement invites the same chal-
lenges, but with even greater force since such an appointment is ex-
ternal to the procedural safeguards of the federal rules. With regard
to monitoring compliance, a consent decree is enforceable by the
power of contempt, so the order of reference should not leave too
much discretion to the special master in determining whether to im-
pose sanctions. For instance, some courts have left it within the insti-
tutional reform master's providence to seek contempt orders himself,
which may unnecessarily call into question the master's impartiality
and cause overreaching.
131
The order of reference should ensure that the master stay rea-
sonably within the parameters of the lawsuit at issue. Commentators
have observed that in some institutional reform cases, the master is
given authority to investigate and determine the constitutionality of
other actions not challenged by the original lawsuit.38 This is prob-
lematic, especially when the master's determinations are made with-
out an opportunity for the defendant institution to be heard in an ad-
versarial proceeding and when the master can enforce compliance via
contempt proceedings. 9
In § 14141 litigation, the parties should be encouraged to find
1_4 Farrell, supra note 114, at 249-50.
See id. at 250.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c) (providing that the order of reference to a master may specify
or limit powers); Farrell, supra note 114, at 251.
137 See Debra Dobray, The Role of Masters in Court Ordered Institutional Reform, 34
BAYLOR L. REV. 581,591-92 (1982).
1 Id. at 602-03.
1
3 9
1 d. at 603.
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someone with unbiased expertise in police procedures and account-
ability, perhaps with prior experience in settlement of § 1983 actions
with knowledge of both parties' sensibilities and legitimate interests.
Canons of judicial ethics may apply, so the order of reference should
provide for recusal upon becoming aware of a conflict of interest; it
should require also that the master not serve as an expert witness for
either party in the future or take similar measures to preclude ethical
140concerns.
Magistrate Brazil observed that in recent complex litigation in-
volving Michigan fishing rights, the judge thought it especially impor-
tant that the parties have confidence in the person who would serve
as master, in part because of the emotions permeating the case.14 The
need for an appointment that carries the trust of the parties involved
is no less vital in the § 14141 context. If a special master, or an analo-
gous person or entity, is appointed to gather and analyze facts or
make substantive determinations as to potential claims or degree of
compliance with a decree, impartiality and the appearance of imparti-
ality is imperative - particularly because when conducting out-of-
court investigations, the master functions without the procedural
safeguards that check reliability of reasoning and conclusions.'
In the consent decrees and memoranda of agreement so far, most
often the DOJ and the defendant city select the monitor responsible
for overseeing compliance. Most decrees and memoranda of agree-
ment provide that the parties shall select a monitor or, if unable to
agree, that the court shall appoint a monitor among the names of
candidates submitted by the parties.' Noticeably absent is the input
'40 Farrell, supra note 114, at 277-78. The Los Angeles consent decree provides that the
monitor shall not have personal involvement in the last five years with a claim or lawsuit
against the defendants. Consent Decree, United States v. Los Angeles, No. CV
00-11769(GAF), Part XI, T 159 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm (last visited May 2, 2003).
The New Jersey decree provides that the monitor shall not testify in any other litigation,
issue statements or make findings with regard to acts or omissions of the defendants, ex-
cept as authorized by the decree. Consent Decree, United States v. New
Jersey, No. 99 CV-5970(MLC), 116 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999),
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm (last visited May 2, 2003).
.4 Brazil, supra note 113, at 410.
14' Id. at 418.
143 See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99 CV-5970(MLC), T 115,
(D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm (last visited
May 2, 2003); Consent Decree, United States v. City of Steubenville, No. 97 CV-966, 82
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/steubensa.htm (last
visited May 2, 2003); see also Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice and the City of Buffalo, 53 (Sept. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/buffalo-police-agreement.htm (last visited May
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of the community stakeholders in appointing the monitor or auditor.
The Pittsburgh consent decree provides that "the City shall appoint
an independent auditor who shall report on a quarterly basis the
City's compliance with each provision of this Consent Decree.'
14
With all due respect for the auditor's hard work and integrity, the
provision for appointment seems a paradox; it stands to reason how
the auditor is truly independent if appointed by the defendant city
under investigation.
In Los Angeles, the city and the DOJ select the monitor, who
must have experience as a law enforcement officer, expertise in law
enforcement practices or experience as a law enforcement practices
monitor."' Although experience as a law enforcement practices
monitor is not as troublesome, the other terms of selection create at
least an appearance of bias to uninvolved civilian stakeholders who
had no say in the appointment. This is particularly controversial since
the monitor is to have primary responsibility in reporting compliance
with the decree to the court, as provided by the decree.'46
Courts should allow an opportunity for community input in ap-
pointing a special master. In addressing problems of police brutality,
excessive force and racial profiling, scholars have emphasized the
need for community representation on civilian advisory councils.'47
Reenah Kim has observed that the uncertain success of § 14141 is due
in part to the limited ability of the federal government to utilize local
knowledge to improve local police departments. 148  Since the DOJ
possesses limited resources and limited ability to call upon local
knowledge, courts are well advised to allow nonparties who are none-
theless among the primary stakeholders in the litigation an opportu-
nity to voice their opinions on a proposed order of reference to pro-
vide for a better-advised appointment that has the community's
approval.
By allowing for the input of the citizen stakeholders when ap-
2,2003).
144 Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97 CV-354, T 70 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 26, 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htm (last visited May 2,
2003) (emphasis added).
15 Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 00-11769
(GAF), Part XI, T 158 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm (last visited May 2, 2003).
146 Id. at Part XI, 173.
147 See, e.g., Reenah L. Kim, Note, Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policing: The
Need for Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory
Councils, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 461 (2001).
148 Id. at 475.
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pointing a special master, courts may preclude situations such as in
Los Angeles, where civil rights groups sought to intervene to be in-
cluded as monitors of the consent decrees, fearing that the court-
appointed monitor would fail to represent their interests.'49 In United
States v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court's denial of the community groups' and individuals' motion to
intervene as of right and reversed the district court's denial of permis-
sive intervention."' The Ninth Circuit held that although the commu-
nity interveners had a protectable interest, they were not entitled to
intervention as of right because their interests were not sufficiently
impaired by the litigation."' In particular, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that: the litigation did not prevent individual suits against the city or
police officers to address unconstitutional patterns and practices; the
litigation did not prevent the community organizations from con-
tinuing to work on police reform; and the individuals and community
members had not overcome the presumption that the U.S. adequately
protected their interests9
In contrast, the Highland Park consent decree that resulted from
the DOJ's § 14141 investigation was an outgrowth of a class action
and provides that the decree and judgment shall constitute a final
resolution of all claims arising out of the incidents alleged in the com-
plaint, whether asserted or not, including claims by the plaintiff
class.'53 The consent decree is therefore expressly binding on the
named plaintiffs as well as the plaintiff class. The § 14141 agreements
in Los Angeles and Highland Park, taken together, stand for the
proposition that the more expressly binding the decree is on the class
of stakeholders, the greater the need for allowing notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard in light of the possibility of motions to intervene
and similar claims of insufficient alignment of interests.
The court in United States v. City of Los Angeles recognized the
potential for involvement of the community groups and individuals,
... See Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41,
104-05 (2001).
"0 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002).
" ' Id. at 402; see FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
112 Id. at 402-03. The presumption of adequate representation was not overcome by evi-
dence of President Bush's express opposition to consent decrees between the federal gov-
ernment and local law enforcement and express dislike for this kind of lawsuit.
153 Consent Decree, Bedford v. City of Highland Park, No. 00-CV-4212, 'IT1 1-4, 10 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 5, 2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/Highland-CD.htm (last visited
May 2, 2003).
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as well as the police league.'54 The Ninth Circuit held that permissive
intervention in § 14141 suits must be granted on a case-by-case basis,
focusing on analysis of factors in Rule 24(b), and rejected the notion
that intervention for enforcement of a government consent decree is
never permissible.'55 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the interests of
the community groups, individuals and police league, notwithstanding
the parties' arguments that intervention would slow the process, stat-
ing that "the idea of 'streamlining' the litigation ... should not be ac-
complished at the risk of marginalizing those -- such as the Police
League and the Community Interveners -- who have some of the
strongest interests in the outcome."'56 Counsel for the community in-
terveners, Mark Rosenbaum, Legal Director of the ACLU/SC, aptly
asserted that "[t]he integrity of the historic consent decree cannot be
preserved if the ultimate stakeholders - the communities who have
suffered police abuse time and again - are locked out of the enforce-
ment process.... the people of Los Angeles must be involved in
monitoring compliance with the decree.'
57
3. Uses of masters in complex litigation and potential benefits in § 14141
cases: efficiency, independence, delegation of responsibility and
humanity
In complex litigation in the toxic tort context and in institutional
154 288 F.3d at 404. The court stated, in relevant part:
If the court had allowed permissive intervention, the Community
Interveners would have made proposals in connection with the pro-
posed consent decree. The fact that the Community Interveners
may also be interested in the enforcement of the consent decree is
not fatal to their permissive intervention request. Because the re-
quest was filed before the consent decree was approved, the request
should have been analyzed on its own merits without anticipatory
consideration of the effect of the proposed decree.
Id.
.5 Id. at 403.
16 Id. at 404. On remand, the district court granted the community groups' and individu-
als' renewed motion for permissive intervention. United States v. Los Angeles, No. CV
00-11769(GAF)(RCX), 2002 WL 31288087, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2002). The court ex-
pressed skepticism regarding the promised benefits of intervention, but conceded that if
the interveners provided valuable input and assistance to the monitor and the court, they
will have served an important function. Id. The court stated, however, that if the inter-
veners proved counterproductive, it would not hesitate to vacate its order permitting in-
tervention. Id.
157 Mark Rosenbaum, Press Release, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Requires District
Court To Reassess Whether Community Groups and Individuals Should Be Part
of LAPD Consent Decree Case, ACLU-SC (Apr. 22, 2002),
http://www.aclu-sc.org/news/releases/20020422ninthcirccnstdcre.shtml (last visited May 2,
2003).
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reform cases, masters have served as surrogate judges in limited ca-
pacity, pretrial managers, mediators, facilitators of negotiation, inves-
tigators of compliance and administrators of remedial decrees.'
Masters appointed to supervise discovery have exercised the author-
ity of judges to rule on nondispositive motions regarding document
production, questions of privilege and how parties will proceed to
trial.9 They also have made preliminary findings of fact necessary to
support motions.6 They are not bound to proceed through formal
hearings and argument, however, so they arguably have the capacity
to promote efficiency and economy.16' For instance, In re Agent Or-
ange Product Liability Litigation involved a special master who en-
gaged in a practice of ex parte communications with the parties' ex-
press agreement, which proved essential to later settlement
negotiations.' A special master may become involved in the fact
gathering process and develop an understanding of the case that a
court constrained by docket congestion may not.'63 Professor Farrell
has observed that one special master in Agent Orange, Sol Schreiber,
believed he was able to "get into the trenches" during discovery in a
way that a judge could not."
In a discussion of City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Com-
mission, Magistrate Brazil emphasized the importance of a special
master in providing for solutions that involve the public.' In City of
Quincy, a special master was given a broad mandate to investigate,
conduct hearings, find relevant facts, analyze possible solutions and
draft proposed remedies in the form of an injunction.'66 The master,
Professor Charles M. Haar, decided that feasible long range solutions
would require the support of the public and of the governmental
agencies.'67 Professor Haar's efforts to stimulate public opinion and
involve interested citizens in the investigation led to improved com-





I6'Id. (citing 475 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
"' Id. at 259.
'6I Id. Professor Farrell's case studies were based on research and personal interviews with
masters and judges conducted at the Federal Judicial Center. Id. at 255 n.84.
165 Brazil, supra note 113, at 414-15 (citing CV 138,477 (Mass. Dist. Ct., Norfolk County,
filed Dec. 17, 1982)); see also Special Project-The Remedial Phase in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784,812-13 (1978).
166 Brazil, supra note 113, at 415.
167 Id. at 415.
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munication and cooperation by the agencies involved, rather than al-
ienation of affected parties, and ultimate agreement with his report
and recommended remedies.'68 Magistrate Brazil observed that
"public law cases, where a master can affect important policies or so-
cial institutions ... demonstrate an acute need to maximize public
confidence in the openness and fairness of the decision process."'69
Otherwise, disagreement over actions taken by such agents of the
court may lead to protracted litigation.' °
In § 14141 cases, special masters could be employed to assist the
court in assessing facts, encourage agreement among the parties, en-
courage nonparty stakeholders to participate, help the parties deter-
mine the content of a proposed decree and oversee implementation.
In terms of encouraging participation, the Columbia Special Project
has observed that although increasing party participation might be
thought to slow the remedy formulation process, it frequently has the
opposite effect. 1. "B y provoking simultaneously the efforts of several
participants a court protects itself against the failure of any one par-
ticipant to produce an adequate remedy, and may goad one or more
of the others to an at least minimally acceptable effort."'' The special
master could replace the monitor or auditor in consent decrees en-
tered so far, as well as assume additional roles earlier in the process.
In consent decrees so far, the monitor or auditor's primary responsi-
bility is overseeing compliance and reporting implementation of the
agreement.
The fact that the monitor's report is often the last link between
oversight of compliance and the court underscores the need for im-
partiality and independence. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, upon in-
dependent review of the Police Department's Board of Inquiry report
on the Rampart scandal, specifically recommended creation of an in-
dependent commission external to the police department to investi-
Id. at 416.
I69 d. at 419.
170 See id. at 405; see, e.g., United States v. Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002).
"' Special Project, supra note 1665 at 812-13.
172 id.
173 See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. Los Angeles, No. CV-00-11769(GAF),
Part XI, IT 158-59, 173 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm (last visited May 2, 2003); Consent
Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-CV-5970 (MLC), T 115-19 (D.N.J. Dec. 30,
1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm (last visited May 2, 2003);
Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-CV-354, 71 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
26, 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htm (last visited May 2, 2003).
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gate the extent and nature of police corruption and lawlessness."' He
further recommended that an outside monitor or auditor with en-
forcement authority oversee implementation of reform and urged
substantial strengthening of the independence of the Inspector Gen-
eral, a position created at the behest of the Independent Commission
of the Los Angeles Police Department to oversee administration of
discipline within the department.
175
Although consent decrees so far have required that information
collected be released to the monitor, the court and the DOJ, the de-
crees usually do not involve the community in overseeing compli-
ance. 17 Even if police departments are hesitant to allow for direct
community review boards, special masters can allow for community
voices to be heard through delegating the responsibility of reviewing
compliance. Courts may appoint special masters with authority to
delegate tasks to civilian advisory boards when monitoring compli-
ance.'77 Review of compliance would then be more streamlined and
involve nonparty stakeholders in a fact-finding and consulting capac-
ity, giving the district court ultimate decision-making authority in
keeping with Article III, but providing for a more thorough and in-
formed review of compliance.
While some may argue that the cost of special masters is high,
courts in § 14141 suits should bear in mind long term efficiencies that
the use of masters may provide. The same functions performed by
masters - which do not necessarily require discretion left to Article
III judges - might otherwise be performed by judges ultimately at a
greater cost to taxpayers.' 78 Masters who have the parties' trust and
who develop expertise throughout the process may prove instrumen-
tal to the valid pursuit of settlement negotiations and may serve a vi-
tal function in promoting the efficient resolution of cases.
Section 14141 cases are often characterized by allegations of
abuse of authority or even physical abuse of victim individuals. As
such, regardless of the merits, these suits are highly sensitive to the
114 Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department's
Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 545, 555, 646
(2001), earlier version available at
http://lawweb.usc.edu/faculty/chemerinsky/rampart-finalrep.html (last visited May 2,
2003).
175 d.
116 See Garrett, supra note 149, at 101-03.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (affirming award of
fees to special master notwithstanding challenge to provision in order of reference that
delegated master's functions to legal assistants where efficient and economical).
178 Farrell, supra note 114, at 275.
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communities at issue, both the defendant police departments and the
individual stakeholders whose interests are essentially represented by
the DOJ. A special master who is able to get in the trenches of the
litigation may prove beneficial on a human level. Professor Farrell
observes that by appointing a special master, "courts provide litigants
in large class action suits with a judicial figure who has the time and
interest to talk to them, listen to their problems, commiserate where
appropriate, and rule with a compassionate understanding of the hu-
manness of the dispute to be resolved." '79
B. Proposal of Consent Decrees
1. Basic principles and relevance of parties' intent
When negotiating and reviewing consent decrees, parties and
courts must consider whose interests are at stake throughout the
stages of implementation, since it is an agreement negotiated at arm's
length as well as a judicial order.'0 The parties should bear in mind
and identify the type of decree involved. The Supreme Court has
stated that, regarding the two types of decrees that parties may enter
into, "[t]he distinction is between restraints that give protection to
rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substan-
tially impervious to change, and those that involve supervision of
changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tenta-
tive.... ,,"" Institutional reform decrees - as in prison reform, school
desegregation, and § 14141 suits - are examples of the type of decree
that involves changing conduct or conditions.'82 The distinction is
relevant for the purpose of determining whether the decree should be
readily adaptable to change.
As consent decrees are interpreted according to contract princi-
ples, a proposal for a consent decree should be made with an eye to-
ward the potential for review or modification, setting forth with par-
ticularity the intent of the parties within the four corners of the
agreement. One problem that may arise upon appeal of motions to
modify decrees is uncertainty as to the parties' purpose. For instance,
in Rufo, the parties to the jail reform litigation had agreed that single
'I Id. at 286.
See supra note 37.
181 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 379 (1992) (quoting United States
v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106,114-15 (1932)).
"* See David Levine, The Latter Stages of Enforcement of Equitable Decrees: The Course
of Institutional Reform Cases After Dowell, Rufo, and Freeman, 20 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 579, 639 (1993).
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cells were the plaintiffs' rightful position, but the U.S. Supreme Court
inexplicably decided that the plaintiff inmates' rightful position was
rather the constitutional floor, which left room for double cells."3
Parties to a § 14141 consent decree, police departments and the DOJ,
as well as any interveners, should therefore clearly set out the pur-
pose within the four corners of the document, so that one party's bar-
gained-for rightful position is not misinterpreted and given short
shrift. A reviewing court would then have more basis for deference
to the district court's determination of the parties' intent.
For example, the New Jersey consent decree mandates that, ex-
cept when suspect-specific, state troopers shall be "prohibited from
considering in any fashion and to any degree the race or national or
ethnic origin of civilian drivers or passengers in deciding which vehi-
cles to subject to any motor stop .... .""8 This imposes arguably a
more stringent prohibition on New Jersey state troopers than does
the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Whren v. United States.'85 The Court in Whren held that the constitu-
tional reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved, which effectively al-
lows pretextual stops. 8 6 Thus, if an officer stops a motorist in New
Jersey ostensibly for a traffic violation, but the actual reason was sim-
ply that the motorist was a young black male in a low income neigh-
borhood at night, the stop would violate the New Jersey consent de-
cree, but not the Fourth Amendment. As such, the parties to the
New Jersey decree have apparently raised the bar higher than the
constitutional floor, which may be relevant for later review or modifi-
cation.
183 502 U.S. at 387. The district court had determined the parties' purpose was to provide
for single cells, but the Supreme Court stated that if the prison provided a "new facility
providing double cells that would meet constitutional standards, it is doubtful they would
have violated the decree." Id. Professor Levine has explained that unless clearly errone-
ous, the district court's determination should have prevailed, for the Supreme Court rein-
terpreted the parties' purpose to provide for a lesser rightful position than agreed upon.
See Levine, supra note 116, at 640-41.
",Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-CV-5970 (MLC), 26, (D.N.J.
Dec. 30, 1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm (last visited May 2,
2003)(emphasis added).
185 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
.. Id. at 813. The Court held that, although the Constitution prohibits selective enforce-
ment of the law based on race, the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally dis-
criminatory application of the laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment. Subsequent circuit court decisions have allowed pretextual traffic stops de-
spite arguments that the stop was motivated by racial animus. See, e.g., United States v.
Gillyard, 261 F.3d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 2001).
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2. Notice and hearing
In Title VII actions, rather than immediately approve a consent
decree, some courts have held fairness hearings on the proposed de-
cree.' 7 This allows participants to make suggestions about the settle-
ment or object to its features, while providing the court a more com-
plete view of the consequences and policy implications of the decree
provisions. 8' Similarly, when an action is maintained as a class, the
court must grant members of the class an opportunity to appear and
object before a settlement can be approved.' The distinction be-
tween class actions and lawsuits by federal agencies is relevant for
purposes of notice and holding a hearing. When the federal govern-
ment sues to enforce Title VII, for instance, the employer and agency
may negotiate, and the court may approve, a consent decree without
notice or any formal hearing.'" The rationale for not holding a hear-
ing is that the suit binds only the government and the employer, while
other members of the protected group are not precluded from bring-
ing their own suits.'9 ' That reasoning does not apply to § 14141 suits,
however, since recent Supreme Court jurisprudence imposes a pro-
hibitively high bar for injunctive relief in civil rights actions brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."' In § 14141 actions, police officers and lay
citizens alike are beneficiaries of the decree, but only the government
and the named defendants are parties.
In class actions maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), notice to class
members is required as a matter of due process,'93 whereas in § 14141
actions no such requirement affords those benefits to nonparty citi-
zens who are nonetheless affected by the decree. The lack of individ-
ual capacity to sue for injunctive relief and the absence of procedural
safeguards such as those expressly provided by the class action
mechanism create all the more reason for courts to hold a hearing on
the proposed consent decree. The court should require that notice of
the proposed consent decree be published in order to encourage par-
ticipation by amicus curiae. Courts have no incentive to deny amicus
curiae an opportunity to be heard, as they do not possess authority to
"' Schwarzschild, supra note 37, at 911.
Id.
189 FED. R. CiV. P. 23(e).
190 Schwarzschild, supra note 37, at 916.
"' Id. at 916-17.
'9 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
19 See FED. R. CiV. P. 23(c)(2); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-74 (1974).
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nullify a settlement by refusing to consent as an intervener would.194
In the § 14141 action in City of Columbus, the district court observed
that "[tihe issues presented by this action are matters of great public
interest and concern, both to the parties, to the proposed amici, and
to the public at large."'95 In the Los Angeles § 14141 litigation, the
district court expressly invited the participation of amicus curiae.'9
C. Scope of Judicial Review and Factors to Consider When Approving
Consent Decrees
1. Guidance from large scale antitrust and mass tort litigation
In large scale antitrust litigation, as shown by the infamous Mi-
crosoft case, a good deal of debate has arisen among courts and
commentators over the proper scope of judicial review of consent de-
crees. l  Antitrust laws expressly provide for heightened attention be-
fore approval of a consent decree. The Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act (the Tunney Act) imposes additional requirements
upon proposals for consent judgments submitted by the United States
in civil antitrust suits.'98 Under the Tunney Act, before entering any
consent judgment proposed by the United States, the district court
must determine whether the entry of such a consent judgment would
be in the public interest.'99 In setting procedural guidelines for the
public interest determination, the court may appoint a special master
and outside consultants or expert witnesses, as well as request and ob-
194 See Miller, supra note 12, at 179 n.173 (citing United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143,
163-67 (6th Cir. 1991)).
'9'2000 WL 1745293, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2000) (granting United States Representa-
tives' and the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police's motion for leave to partici-
pate amicus curiae).
196 United States v. City of Los Angeles, 2001 WL 314976, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2001).
The court invited the following parties to submit amicus memoranda: Los Angeles Police
Protective League, American Civil Liberties Union, Yagman plaintiffs, Los Angeles
Command Officers Association, Los Angeles County District Attorney, Los Angeles
County Public Defender and Warren Christopher, and Chairman of the Independent
Commission on the LAPD. Id.
"' See Anderson, supra note 37, at 3-4.
198 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2001). For instance, the Tunney Act requires that the United States file
with the court a competitive impact statement which provides, among other things, the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, a description of the practices or events giving rise to
the alleged violation of antitrust laws and an explanation of the proposal for a consent
judgment. The Act also requires that the United States furnish such information to any
person upon request, as well as publish summaries of the proposal's terms in newspapers
of general circulation where the case was filed.
199 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2001).
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tain the views or advice of any individual, group or governmental
agency.2" The court may authorize participation by interested per-
sons or agencies, including amicus curiae, intervention as a party pur-
suant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, examination of wit-
nesses or documentary materials, or participation in any other
manner and extent which the court deems appropriate.""
The legislative history of the Tunney Act reveals that Congress
was motivated by antitrust consent decrees that had failed to provide
adequate relief, either because of miscalculations by the DOJ or be-
cause of the great influence and economic power wielded by antitrust
violators."2 In terms of the amount of deference owed the agency,
some courts have held that the Tunney Act's provisions impose an
independent obligation on the reviewing court, and do not explicitly
defer to the executive agency. "Indeed, it is plain from the statute
and its legislative history that a court, rather than being a 'rubber
stamp' for the DOJ, is required to act as an independent check on the
terms of such decrees.,
20 3
Other courts have applied a far less stringent standard for review
of antitrust consent decrees. In United States v. Microsoft, District
Judge Stanley Sporkin surprised the parties to the litigation by refus-
ing to approve a consent decree agreed upon by the DOJ and Micro-
soft.2"4 After arousing considerable debate regarding the scope of his
discretion, the case was reversed by the D.C. Circuit.2 °5 In an opinion
by Judge Laurence Silberman, the D.C. Circuit held that a district




Courts reviewing § 14141 actions should not explicitly defer to
determinations of fairness by the government. Courts that grant vir-
tually automatic approval may be operating on the assumption that
200 Id. § 16(f).
201 Id.
202 United States v. W. Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 328-29 (D.D.C. 1991) (citing S. REP.
No. 93-298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1973); 120 CONG. REC. 36341 (1974); 119 CONG.
REC. 24598, 3451 (1973)). The court in Western Electric explained that in the legislative
history of the Tunney Act, Congress was disturbed by past consent decrees and settle-
ments negotiated under questionable conditions.
203 Western Electric, 767 F. Supp at 328; see also United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp.
730, 740 (D.D.C. 1984) (noting that in light of the history and purpose of the Tunney Act,
"it is abundantly clear that the courts were not to be mere rubber stamps, accepting what-
ever the parties might present").
204 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1995).
205 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
206 Id. at 1462.
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the federal government acts in the public interest.2" In reality, politi-
cal pressures, in addition to the few lawyers at the DOJ empowered
to bring § 14141 suits vis-A-vis the entire nation's backlog of poten-
tially investigation-worthy cases, may create an incentive to settle.
Moreover, the fact that § 14141 suits are essentially a matter of local
concern that affect entire communities, not just parties to the litiga-
tion, counsels in favor of a more comprehensive and less deferential
review of decrees. The appointment of a special master agreed upon
by the parties early in the proceedings may facilitate a neutral review
of the terms of the decree.
Professor Lloyd Anderson has proposed that the public interest
standard for judicial review of antitrust consent decrees has been
workable and that review should be flexibley 8 He has proposed that
courts take into account factors such as: the extent to which the de-
cree achieves the relief sought in the complaint; the size of the defen-
dant and complexity of the case; the history of abuse; the extent of
litigation prior to settlement; evidence of undue political influence;
and the impact of the decree on third parties, the economy and the
public at large.2" Many of these considerations are relevant to
§ 14141 cases.
Settlement of mass tort litigation also is instructive in regard to
the considerations involved in approval of consent decrees. Judge
William Schwarzer has suggested that when ruling on the dismissal or
compromise of a class action, the court must consider and make
findings with respect to, among other things: whether notice to mem-
bers of the class is adequate, taking into account the ability of persons
to understand the notice and its significance to them; whether the
representation of class members is adequate, taking into account pos-
sible conflicts of interest in the representation of class members
whose claims differ in material respects from those of other claimants;
whether the settlement will have significant effects on potential claims
of class members for injury or loss arising out of the same or related
occurrences but excluded from settlement; whether the settlement
will have significant effects on parties in other actions pending in state
or federal courts; and whether the settlement is likely to be fair and
equitable in its operation."0 These considerations, though formulated
207 Schwarzschild, supra note 37, at 918.
208 Anderson, supra note 37, at 6.
209 id.
210 William W. Schwarzer, Symposium, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of
Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837, 843-44 (1995).
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in regard to settlement of class actions under the federal rules, are
also relevant in § 14141 litigation. The federal government, like a
named plaintiff in a class action, is authorized to bring suit on behalf
of a class of persons who claim injury and seek equitable relief from
unconstitutional patterns and practices by local law enforcement.
2. Review of proposed § 14141 consent decrees and conditional approval
A district court should review § 14141 consent decrees with close
scrutiny. Too much deference to the parties is problematic for several
reasons. Differences in U.S. Attorney Generals' administrations and
the DOJ's scarce resources may affect the parties' relative bargaining
211power. Moreover, what is at stake is the alleged violation of indi-
viduals' constitutional rights. The judiciary has traditionally been a
counter-majoritarian force in crucial civil rights litigation this past
century, when, contrary to Alexander Hamilton's forecast, state and
local governments infringed on minority individuals' rights.212 To al-
low few individuals in the DOJ so much latitude in shaping relief that
transcends the instant pattern or practice case at hand, without rigor-
ous judicial review, would undermine the impartial resolution of cases
affecting communities and minorities in particular. A more active re-
view of consent decrees would serve to counter such imbalance and
underrepresentation.
The following is a nonexhaustive list of suggested factors a court
should consider in reviewing proposed decrees in § 14141 cases:
1) the degree to which the decree achieves the relief sought in the
complaint;
2) the nature of the case, including size of the defendant, scope and
complexity of the proposed terms;
212 See THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton). In conceiving the diffusion of
power between the federal and state governments and the need for each to keep the other
in check, Hamilton envisioned that "the States governments will, in all possible contingen-
cies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national
authorities," id., but as shown by the Reconstruction Congress and the Civil Rights Era, it
has often been the federal government which has afforded security against invasions of
civil liberties by both legislative and executive offices of state and local governments. In
any event, concern for the preservation of states' autonomy should not inhibit federal in-
tervention when civil rights are at stake, because the ultimate purpose is to protect the
citizenry.
[T]he general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations
of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the
general government ... If [the people's] rights are invaded by either, they can
make use of the other as the instrument of redress.
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3) quantity and quality of information available to the court, taking
into account the fact-gathering and interpretive aid of special masters,
experts or monitors, if any;
4) any prior or current history of attempts by the defendant to
evade public scrutiny or accountability;
5) whether notice of the proposed decree to potential interveners
has been adequate;
6) whether the representation of nonparties who nonetheless have a
stake in the litigation has been adequate, taking into account possible
conflicts of interest;
7) whether the decree will have significant effects on potential
claims of nonparties for injury or loss arising out of the same or re-
lated occurrences, taking into account the preclusive effect of the de-
cree, if any;
8) whether the decree will have significant effects on parties in
other actions pending in state or federal courts; and
9) whether implementation of the reform is likely to be fair and eq-
uitable in its operation, taking into account whether the terms pro-
vide for neutral selection of a monitor, to which nonparty
stakeholders have had an opportunity to object.
If the court were to provide for a special master to monitor com-
pliance, as this note has suggested, it could condition approval of the
proposed decree on including a provision that leaves it within the
court's province to appoint a special master on its terms, in order to
guarantee interested nonparties an opportunity for comment or ob-
jection. Courts have conditioned approval of consent decrees in
other contexts to ensure proper enforcement. For instance, in related
cases involving consent decrees between state and federal govern-
ments and Microsoft, the court granted conditional approval of the
consent decree pending an alteration which makes clear that the court
may take appropriate action regarding enforcement of the decree on
its own volition and without prompting by the parties."3 Closer re-
view of proposed consent decrees, with an eye toward manageable
standards and appropriate factors for consideration, would promote
more meaningful relief, reduce the potential for protracted litigation
and lessen the difference in treatment of § 14141 cases by the DOJ
across different presidential administrations, thereby providing for a
more even-handed resolution of similar pattern or practice cases.
213 United States v. Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 201 (D.D.C. 2002); New York v. Micro-
soft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 203, 258-59 (D.D.C. 2002).
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D. Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction over Consent Decrees
After a court has approved a consent decree, the court typically
retains jurisdiction in order to supervise implementation, enforce
compliance with its terms and modify the decree when necessary."'
Parties may include in the decree an express provision by which the
court retains jurisdiction, but even without such a clause, the court
has inherent authority to enforce its decree, which includes the power
of contempt.
15
Parties may include in the consent decree a provision limiting the
court's jurisdiction to a specified time. 6 Such a provision is valid if
bargained for in good faith and approved by the court, but the court
must then release jurisdiction upon expiration of the specified time."7
On the other hand, if the parties do not include such a provision the
court retains jurisdiction until, in its discretion, it decides to release
it.
218
Professor Anderson has pointed out relevant underlying consid-
erations when determining whether to release jurisdiction. First, be-
cause a consent decree is a contract, parties have an expectation in-
terest and are entitled to the benefit of their bargain."9 With respect
to § 14141 actions, the parties include only the United States and the
defendant local authorities, but the civilians in the community are es-
sentially third party beneficiaries.220 In § 14141 cases, at a minimum,
their interests should be taken into account. Second, courts have in-
centive to ensure compliance with the decree because a consent de-
cree is an order as well as a contract, and the court's authority is
equally at stake.22 ' Third, the court should be shielded from the bur-
den of renewed litigation that would result from a premature release
of jurisdiction. 22 The court should therefore tread with caution when
214 Lloyd C. Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction Over Consent Decrees in
Structural Reform Litigation, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 401,402 (1987).
211 Sarabia v. Toledo Police Patrolman's Ass'n, 601 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1979); Stanwood
v. Green, 559 F. Supp. 196, 198-99 (D. Or. 1983), affd, 744 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1984); An-
derson, supra note 214, at 402-03.
... See South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610,613 (7th Cir. 1985); Anderson, supra note 214, at 404.
217 Id.
218 See, e.g., Kendrick v. Bland, 659 F. Supp. 1188,1191 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
219 Anderson, supra note 214, at 405.
221 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981); United States v. City of
Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 404 (9th Cir. 2002) (analogizing community interveners' status
to that of third party beneficiaries in § 14141 suit).
221 See City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 391.
222 Id. at 405-06.
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considering release of jurisdiction.
The test for release of jurisdiction is two-pronged. The defen-
dant must prove substantial compliance with the requirements of the
decree; neither good faith efforts nor progress toward achieving the
goals are sufficient.223 If the defendant has proved substantial compli-
ance, the court must release jurisdiction unless a strong likelihood
exists that the defendants will violate the decree in the future.224
With respect to substantial compliance, compliance with the un-
derlying law is insufficient here; what is determinative is whether the
defendant's actions have satisfied the intent of the parties at the time
the decree was entered.225 This is another reason the parties should
clearly articulate their intent. With respect to likelihood of future
violation, the standard used by courts in determining whether likeli-
hood of future violation exists involves analysis of the defendant's
past record of compliance and the defendant's present attitudes to-
ward the reforms mandated.226 Courts therefore should be mindful of
the defendant's attitude toward compliance with the decree from the
outset, at the proposal stage. The more hostile the defendant, the
more skepticism is warranted regarding the possibility of future viola-
tion. For example, Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan was initially
adamant in stating that he would never sign a consent decree with the
DOJ, whereas the mayor and police chief in D.C. welcomed the
DOJ's assistance in devising remedial measures even without a court
order.227
Section 14141 consent decrees so far typically provide that the
court retains jurisdiction during a finite term and that, if the DOJ
objects to the defendant's motion to terminate, the court must hold a
hearing at which both parties may present evidence.2' The decrees
See Anderson, supra note 214, at 406 (citing Finney v. Ark. Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194,
199-200 (8th Cir. 1974); Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 265, 268-72, 274-75 (1st Cir.
1982)).
24 Anderson, supra note 214, at 406-11.
2' Kendrick v. Bland, 659 F. Supp. 1181, 1192 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
226 See, e.g., Morgan, 689 F.2d at 280; Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, 12 F.3d 286,
292 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Anderson, supra note 214, at 411).
2' Los Angeles Will Not Accept Consent Decree on Police Reform, Mayor Says, CNN, June
20, 2000, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/06/07/lapd/index.html (last visited May 2, 2003).
For several months, Mayor Riordan refused to sign a consent decree with the DOJ, stat-
ing: "We don't need them to run our department.... They're not going to get a consent
decree." Compare Attorney General News Conference with DC Mayor Anthony Wil-
liams and DC Police Chief Charles Ramsey (June 13, 2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/mpdpressconf.htm (last visited May 2, 2003).
... See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-CV-5970 (MLC), $ 131,
(D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm (last visited
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fail to provide for notice to the community or opportunity for com-
ment. Providing notice of a motion to terminate and allowing a rea-
sonable time for interested parties to file amicus briefs or otherwise
voice their opinions would not only promote more meaningful relief,
it would also provide for more finality by decreasing the likelihood of
motions to intervene at later stages of implementation and efforts to
reopen or relitigate issues. Since the determination of whether to re-
lease jurisdiction depends on detailed findings of fact, a special mas-
ter may be employed here to make preliminary factual inquiries, as-
sess information submitted by nonparty stakeholders and submit a
report and recommendation to the court. It should be noted that §
14141 consent decrees so far have explicitly incorporated the "sub-
stantial compliance" terminology, but they have not mentioned like-
lihood of future violation.229 Courts on their own initiative therefore
should inquire as to the likelihood of future violation, irrespective of
whether the decree only mentions substantial compliance.
After the court's release of jurisdiction, plaintiffs have two viable
alternatives for seeking enforcement of a consent decree: filing a mo-
tion for relief from a judgment or order under Rule 60(b) or filing a
new suit.230 Filing a new suit is appropriate when parties seek to raise
new claims not addressed in the original decree, in addition to or in
lieu of claims that the defendant has violated the decree.231 If faced
with the question whether to resume jurisdiction, district courts there-
fore must consider whether the claims fall within or go beyond the
terms of the decree. If the court utilizes procedures that have proven
beneficial in complex litigation, it may decrease the likelihood of pro-
tracted litigation in the form of Rule 60(b) motions or new lawsuits.
IV. Conclusion
The drafters of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 realized the gap left by the
modern Court's equitable standing doctrine in the civil rights context
and deliberately fashioned a measure whereby a court could identify
a pattern of abuse and "bring it to an end with a single legal action.,
232
May 2, 2003); Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-CV-354, T 79
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htm (last visited
May 2, 2003).
229 See id.; see also Consent Decree, United States v. Los Angeles, No. CV-00-11769(GAF),
Part XII, 179 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm (last visited May 2, 2003).
230 Anderson, supra note 214, at 413.
2' Id. at 415.
13' H.R. REP. No. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 406, 1991 WL 206794, at *138 (1991).
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When police policies and practices upstream are the source of a
problem, suits against individual officers downstream provide little
long term benefit. Section 14141 is thus aimed at institutional reform,
targeted at patterns or practices, and carries the potential for long
term structural benefit to both communities and law enforcement of-
ficials.
Neither the text nor the legislative history of § 14141 affords in-
struction on the implementation of reform measures. This note sug-
gests that courts find guidance from procedures and considerations in
complex litigation, particularly where the instant lawsuit is brought on
behalf of, or affects, multiple parties and nonparties alike. In order
for a consent decree to provide durable relief to the ultimate
stakeholders, the stakeholders should be involved in the process
through workable procedures. This note has focused on appointment
and uses of a special master throughout the process, provision of no-
tice and opportunity for comment prior to approval of the consent
decree, factors to take into account when approving the decree and
considerations that arise when deciding whether to release jurisdic-
tion. Complex litigation may provide valuable lessons in other as-
pects, as well. In taking an active stance toward management, utiliz-
ing available procedures, courts may provide the relief to
underrepresented individuals that 42 U.S.C. § 14141 promises, as well
as the long term benefit to law enforcement officials of being rid of
systemic constitutional violation and trusted by the citizenry they pro-
tect.
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